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OPINION OF THE COURT

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
The issue before us is whether a School District, in order
to maintain a policy of complete religious neutrality, may
prohibit celebratory religious music at school-sponsored events.
The District Court, in a careful analysis of the facts on record
and the applicable law, upheld the School District’s discretion to
maintain and enforce its policy. Stratechuk v. Bd. of Educ., S.
Orange-Maplewood Sch. Dist., 577 F. Supp. 2d 731 (D.N.J.
2008).
The unsuccessful plaintiff, Michael Stratechuk, the father
of two students in the School District of South OrangeMaplewood, New Jersey (“School District”), appeals the District
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Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the School
District (and related defendants) on Stratechuk’s claims filed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the School District’s policy on
the performance of religious holiday music violates the
Establishment Clause and his children’s First Amendment “right
to receive information and ideas, right to learn, and right to
academic freedom.” Id. at 749.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
Policy 2270, “Religion in the Schools” (“Policy 2270”),
was adopted on April 2, 2001, by the South Orange-Maplewood
Board of Education. It provided that:
It is the goal of the [School District] to foster mutual
understanding and respect for the right of all individuals
regarding their beliefs, values and customs. In pursuing
this goal, we recognize that we serve a diverse
community with varying cultural, ethnic and religious
orientation.
We are cognizant of the role of culture, including
religion, in the development of our society and believe
that objectively teaching about religion and its role in the
social and historical development of civilization does not
violate the religious neutrality of the public schools.
Music, art, literature, dance and drama along with
religious customs and traditions, which have come to us
from various elements of our national population, may be
used to broaden our pupils’ awareness of the many
elements that comprise our diverse American culture.
In any reference to religion in the schools, the district is
guided by the following concepts when determining the
appropriateness of activities: (1) the activity should have
a secular purpose, (2) the activity should neither advance
nor inhibit religion, and (3) the activity should have
3

relevance to the curriculum.
App. at 365.
On the issue of the “Treatment of Religion in the
Curriculum,” Policy 2270 permitted the “inclusion of religious
literature, music, drama, dance and visual arts in the curriculum
provided that it achieves specific goals of the written curriculum
in the various fields of study; that it is presented objectively; and
that it neither inhibits nor advances any religious point of view.”
App. at 365. It also permitted student-initiated expression of
“religious belief or non-belief in compositions, works of art,
music, speech and debate.” App. at 365. Policy 2270 permitted
the use of religious symbols only “to teach about historical or
cultural context, not to promote or celebrate religious concepts,
events or holidays.” App. at 365.
As most relevant to this appeal, the section,“Treatment of
Religious Holidays in Classrooms, School Buildings, Programs
or Concerts,” provided:
1. Religious holidays are not to be celebrated in the
schools, except in the form of the secular nature of that
holiday. However, opportunities to learn about cultural
and religious traditions should be provided within the
framework of the curriculum. Information about religious
and cultural holidays and traditions, focusing on how and
when they are celebrated, their origins and histories may
be part of this instruction.
2. In planning school activities related to the teaching
about religious holidays or themes, special effort must be
made to ensure the activity is not devotional and that
pupils of all faiths and beliefs can join without feeling
they are betraying their own faith or beliefs.
3. Decorations with religious significance are not
permitted.
4. Religious music, like any other music, can only be used
if it achieves specific goals of the music curriculum.
a. Music programs prepared or presented by student
groups as an outcome of the curriculum shall not have
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a religious orientation or focus on religious holidays.
App. at 366.
Prior to the 2004-2005 academic year, holiday music
(Christmas and Hanukkah songs) were performed at the School
District’s December concerts. In the Fall of 2003, the mother of
a School District student told her child’s music teacher, William
Cook, that she objected to her daughter playing the “Christmas
Sing Along” at the December concert. App. at 77. Cook
recounted this concern to Nicholas Santoro, the Director of Fine
Arts, who passed the concerns on to James Memoli, the
Assistant Superintendent.
In any event, the music repertoire of the December 2003
concert included “Star Spangled Banner,” “Sounds of Hanukkah
(a medley of 3 Hanukkah tunes),” “Recuerdos de la Alhambra,”
and the “Christmas Sing Along” which was a medley of “Joy to
the World,” “Silent Night,” “Oh, Come All Ye Faithful,” and
“Hark the Herald Angels Sing.”
After that concert, the objecting mother sent a letter to
Peter Horoschak, the Superintendent of the School District,
“express[ing her] concern that the School Board policy was not
followed” because “point 4(a) [of Policy 2270] clearly states
‘Music programs prepared or presented . . . shall not have a
religious orientation or focus on religious holidays.’” App. at
181. The letter continued, “[a]s you know, the selection of
music, both instrumental and vocal, had a clear religious
orientation and focused on religious holidays.” App. at 181-82.
Horoschak responded, “[i]t was our judgment that because of the
variety of both secular and ‘holiday’ (i.e., Hanukkah and
Christmas) selections . . . there was not one particular focus on a
particular religion or religious group, and, as such, there was no
attempt to advance any religious point of view.” App. at 183.
However, he also noted that “concerns raised by parents
regarding the holiday concert at South Orange Middle School
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suggest that the policy needs further clarification,” 1 and that
Memoli and Santoro “are engaged in on-going discussions about
such musical programs, and they will recommend to me
suggested language for regulations which should clarify what
types of programs and activities are permissible and not
permissible under this policy.” App. at 183.
On March 24, 2004, the School Board addressed the
December concert issue at Horoschak’s annual performance
review, and, according to Horoschak’s deposition testimony, the
“board members had heard from some community members
about instrumental music that . . . people felt represented a
celebration of Christmas holidays and also there ha[d] been
discussion about the fact that you really can’t balance all
religious groups in these representations in these types of
performances.” App. at 166. The Board decided “that [Policy
2270] would be consistently implemented . . . [so] that there
wouldn’t be so much discretion . . . by every faculty member,”
and discussed drafting regulations to clarify the policy.
Stratechuk, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 735.
After meeting with relevant faculty and staff, Santoro
issued a memo to the Department of Fine Arts, dated October
29, 2004 (“October 2004 Memo”). It stated that the “board
policy, as it is written, will be implemented,” and included the
following bullet points:
[1.] All programs will be reviewed and approved by me.
...
[2.] We will avoid any selection which is considered to
represent any religious holiday, be it Christmas,

1

The District Court noted that Horoschak “had a general
recollection of parents’ [sic] expressing similar concerns [about]
the December concerts during the time period between 1998 and
2003, although he could not remember any specific instance other
than one where a Muslim parent raised concerns that his/her faith
was not represented during the concert.” Stratechuk, 577 F. Supp.
2d at 734-35 n.1.
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[3.]

[4.]

[5.]
[6.]

Hanukkah, etc. This holds true for any vocal or
instrumental setting.
I would strongly suggest you gear towards the
seasonal selections – Winter Wonderland, Frosty
The Snowman, etc. Music centered on Peace is also
a nice touch.
For the High School, the Brass Ensemble repertoire
must also adhere to this policy, so the traditional
carols must be eliminated from the repertoire.
The MKL [sic] Gospel Choir cannot perform at the
CHS Holiday Assembly for the student body.
Your printed programs for any Holiday concert must
avoid graphics which refer to the holidays, such as
Christmas Trees and dreidels.

App. at 249.
In response to the October 2004 Memo, there were
complaints from, inter alia, music teachers, parents, the South
Orange Village President, and representatives of the MLK
Gospel Choir. For example, seventeen members of the
Maplewood community signed a “Petition Asking the Board of
Education to Honor Religious Tolerance.” App. at 250. Other
complaints were more vigorous.
However, as Cook explained in his deposition testimony,
Policy 2270 “didn’t prohibit all religious music” in
performances, only “music based on . . . or themes consistent
with pieces commonly associated with the holiday at the time of
the holiday.” App. at 92. Accordingly, Santoro approved the
performance of Vivaldi’s Gloria in Excelsio (Cum sancto
spiritu) because “[t]he program does not have a religious
orientation and it does not refer to a holiday. . . .” App. at 370.
In addition, Policy 2270 and the October 2004 Memo
were interpreted to prohibit only the performance of celebratory
holiday music – not the teaching of such music in particular or of
religious music in general. For example, Santoro testified that
“[i]n performance [of the winter] concerts those selections [i.e.,
Joy to the World, Oh, Come All Ye Faithful, Hark, the Herald
7

Angels Sing, and Silent Night] would not be allowed,” although
“[i]n the curriculum they would be allowed to be taught.” App.
at 133. He amplified that point in a letter to music teacher
Barbara Eames stating that she could continue to “teach about
the different holidays in . . . music classes” because “[c]lassroom
work is not a ‘program,’” within the meaning of Policy 2270.
App. at 369. Although Eames contended in a declaration to the
District Court that the October 2004 Memo “has caused me to
exclude certain music pieces that I would have used to achieve
specific goals of the music curriculum” and “has caused me to
censor my music curriculum . . . in a way that I believe is
harmful to [my students’] education and contrary to the goals of
the music curriculum,” App. at 391, she conceded in her
deposition testimony that “I haven’t removed [Christmas or
Chanukah songs] from my classroom curriculum because the
policy does not do that,” App. at 310.
The music performed at the 2004 December concert
(approved by Santoro) included “Jingle Bell Rock,” Vivaldi’s
“Gloria,” “Winter Wonderland,” “Hava Nagila,” “Madrigal of
the Bells,” “Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer,” and “Frosty the
Snowman.” Since 2004, songs with religious content have been
performed at the December concerts; the 2005 concerts included
“Concerto VIII Fatto per la notte di natale,” “Waters of Babylon
(psalm 137),” “Jubilate,” and “Agnus Dei/Cum Sanctis.”
On December 17, 2004, Stratechuk filed this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey (and later an amended complaint)
naming as defendants the School District, its Board of
Education, the Board President and Superintendent Peter P.
Horoschak (together, “School District”).2 The Complaint
alleged that during “the 2004/2005 school year . . . Defendants

2

In addition to stating that Stratechuk was the father of two
minor children enrolled in the School District, the Complaint also
noted that he was a music teacher at Hunter College in Manhattan,
a professional violinist and conductor, and a Christian. Complaint
¶¶ 8-9.
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created, adopted, and implemented a strict policy of banning all
religious music, including instrumentals, from the public schools
in the district,” such that “students . . . are no longer permitted to
learn about, listen to, and participate in the presentation of
traditional Christmas music during such curricular and cocurricular events as year-end holiday concerts, assemblies, and
recitals.” Complaint at ¶ 15. Stratechuk alleged that the School
District’s actions violated his and his minor children’s rights
under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by
“convey[ing] the impermissible, government-sponsored message
of disapproval of and hostility toward religion, including
Christianity. . . .” Complaint at ¶ 21. In addition, Stratechuk
claimed that the same actions deprived him “and his minor
children of their right to receive information and ideas, their
right to learn, and their right to academic freedom, which are
guaranteed under the First Amendment. . . .” Amended
Complaint at ¶ 24. Stratechuk sought (1) a declaratory judgment
that his and his children’s constitutional rights had been violated,
(2) “a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants’ policy,
practice, and/or custom of banning religious music within the
School District,” (3) “damages for the past loss of his and his
minor children’s constitutional rights,” and (4) attorneys’ fees,
costs and expenses. Amended Complaint at 7.
On October 10, 2005, after the period at issue in
Stratechuk’s complaint, the School District amended Policy
2270 by removing Section 4(a). See p. 4-5 supra. At the same
time, in order to clarify Policy 2270 the School District adopted
regulation R-2270, “Religion in the Schools,” App. at 385,
which provides that for children in grades 6-12, the
“performance of music with religious text is appropriate when
doing so is an outgrowth of the curriculum,” but “musical
performances shall not be celebrations of particular religious,
ethnic or cultural holidays,” App. at 386. For elementary school
students, the performance of “music with a religious text shall be
avoided.” App. at 386. In addition, the section entitled
“Celebration of Religious Holidays Prohibited” states that
“[m]usical concerts or assemblies which take place during
holiday seasons will not be ‘holiday concerts,’ which celebrate
religious, cultural or ethnic holidays.” App. at 387. Stratechuk
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has not amended his complaint to include a challenge to this
regulation or any of the School District’s specific actions that
occurred after he filed his amended complaint. The District
Court, Appellees, and Amici correctly note that the schools have
permitted the performance of music with religious content since
2004. See Stratechuk, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 738; Appellee’s Br. at
11-12; Amici’s Br. at 10-11.
The District Court dismissed Stratechuk’s complaint,
finding that his claim relied on Policy 2270 alone and that he
could not state a claim under that policy. See Stratechuk v. Bd.
of Educ. of S. Orange-Maplewood Sch. Dist., 200 F. App’x 91,
93-94 (3d Cir. 2006). This court vacated and remanded in a nonprecedential opinion, noting that the “policy that Stratechuk
alleges was in place in 2004-2005 is decidedly different than the
‘official policy’” articulated in the text of Policy 2270 and
concluding that “a categorical ban on exclusively religious
music,” of the type that Stratechuk alleges, “appears to state a
claim under the First Amendment.” Id. at 94.
On remand, the parties engaged in discovery and both
moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted
summary judgment in favor of the School District, holding that
Policy 2270, as interpreted by the October 2004 Memo (and as
applied) did not violate the Establishment Clause or any First
Amendment “right to receive information, ideas, right to learn,
and right to academic freedom.” Stratechuk, 577 F. Supp. 2d at
749. Stratechuk timely appealed.
II.
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction over Stratechuk’s §
1983 claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3), and this
court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
This court “review[s] a grant or denial of summary
judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the District
Court.” Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 385 (3d Cir. 2008).
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Summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c). “In making this determination, we ‘must view
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
draw all inferences in that party’s favor.’” Norfolk S. Ry. v.
Basell USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 276
(3d Cir. 2001)).
III.
Discussion
A. The Establishment Clause
Stratechuk launched a broad First Amendment attack
against the School District’s interpretation of Policy 2270,
focusing in the first instance on the Establishment Clause.
Under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,3
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion.” U.S. C ONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has read
this clause to forbid not only “law respecting an establishment of
a religion,” U.S. C ONST. amend. I, but also “an official purpose to
disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in general,”
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 532 (1993). “The touchstone for our [Establishment
Clause] analysis is the principle that the ‘First Amendment
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion,
and between religion and nonreligion.’” McCreary County v.
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (quoting Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
Under the so-called Lemon test, a state law or

3

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, “of
course, has long been held applicable to the States.” Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 42 n.10 (1985).
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governmental action violates the Establishment Clause if (1) it
lacks a secular purpose, (2) “its principal or primary effect . . .
advances []or inhibits religion,” or (3) it “foster[s] an excessive
government entanglement with religion.” Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citation and quotation omitted).
Although still good law, see McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 85961, some Justices have criticized the Lemon test, see, e.g.,
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Like some ghoul in a
late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon
stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again,
frightening the little children and school attorneys . . . .”).
Without discarding the Lemon test, the Court has set forth two
related tests, the “coercion test,” see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577 (1992), and the “endorsement test,” see Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). The
District Court analyzed Stratechuk’s claim under Lemon,
concluding that the Lemon test was the most appropriate for the
claim before it. Stratechuk argues that the School District’s
policy and conduct violates the Establishment Clause under both
the Lemon test and the endorsement test.
1.

The Lemon Test

“In applying the purpose [prong of the Lemon] test, it is
appropriate to ask whether government’s actual purpose is to
endorse or disapprove of religion.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 56 (1985) (internal quotation omitted). “While [a court] is
normally deferential to a State’s articulation of a secular
purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose be
sincere and not a sham.” Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
586-87 (1987). As such, “[t]he eyes that look to purpose belong
to an objective observer, one who takes account of the traditional
external signs that show up in the text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute, or comparable official act.”
McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 862 (internal quotations omitted).
Here, there is no religious purpose – only a secular one –
so the issue is whether this secular purpose is actually, as
12

Stratechuk maintains, a purpose to disapprove of religion. The
School District argues, and the District Court found, that the
purpose of the policy was to avoid government endorsement of
religious holidays and a potential Establishment Clause
violation. Although there are few opinions addressing this type
of secular purpose, the District Court cited several courts of
appeals’ opinions where the courts held that “[a]ctions taken to
avoid potential Establishment Clause violations have a secular
purpose under the purpose prong of the Lemon test.” Stratechuk,
577 F. Supp. 2d at 743 (citing Vasquez v. Los Angeles County,
487 F.3d 1246, 1255 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that county’s
removal of the image of the cross from its official seal in order
“to avoid a potential Establishment Clause violation [had a]
valid secular purpose under Lemon”); Roberts v. Madigan, 921
F.2d 1047, 1054 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that school district’s
order directing teacher not to leave his bible in sight or read
silently from it during classroom hours had a secular purpose in
that it was intended “to assure that none of [the teacher’s]
classroom materials or conduct violated the Establishment
Clause”); cf. Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523
F.3d 153, 174 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court has stated
that ‘compliance with the Establishment Clause is a state interest
sufficiently compelling to justify content-based restrictions on
speech.’” (quoting Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1995)))). Indeed, our own court
has said as much. Busch v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., 567
F.3d 89, 100 (3d Cir. 2009).
Stratechuk maintains that this alleged purpose is a “sham”
because the Establishment Clause does not require a prohibition
on performing religious music and “[v]irtually every court that
has been asked to review year-end holiday concerts or music
programs that have included religious music or music associated
with religious holidays has upheld them.” Appellant’s Reply Br.
at 19-20. In support of this assertion, Stratechuk cites cases
from the Eighth, Tenth, and Fifth Circuits that upheld the
constitutionality of performing religious music in public schools.
Appellant’s Reply Br. at 20 (citing Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman
v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 562 (10th Cir. 1997) (upholding
Utah school policy permitting music teacher to select explicitly
13

Christian music and Christian religious sites for performance of
school choir); Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402,
407-08 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding Texas high school’s practices,
such as permitting choir to use Christian religious song as its
theme song); Florey v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 619 F.2d
1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980) (upholding South Dakota school
policy that permitted music “having religious themes or basis,”
including Christmas carols, as “part of the curriculum for schoolsponsored activities and programs if presented in a prudent and
objective manner . . . .”)).
The cases cited by Stratechuk all upheld the policy of the
respective schools or school districts. That is far different from
holding that the First Amendment compels a school district to
permit religious holiday music or risk running afoul of the First
Amendment. Stratechuk has offered no persuasive authority that
the First Amendment prevents South Orange-Maplewood School
District from formulating a policy that precludes performance of
religious holiday music.
Moreover, as the District Court noted, the assumption
“that the Establishment Clause does not require the restrictions
enacted by Defendants . . . does not automatically render
Defendants’ stated purpose a ‘sham.’” Stratechuk, 577 F. Supp.
2d at 744. In other words, even if performance of religious
songs did not violate the Establishment Clause, it does not
follow that the goals underlying the School District’s desire to
avoid a potential Establishment Clause violation were
disingenuous or impermissible.
A similar issue was raised in Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d
1066, 1077 (11th Cir. 1991). In that case, a University had
placed certain limits on a professor’s in-class comments
regarding religion. The court upheld those limits under the
Lemon test even assuming that the comments did not violate the
Establishment Clause. The court explained that “the restrictions
neither advance nor inhibit religion – to the contrary, the
University . . . simply attempted to maintain a neutral, secular
classroom . . . .” Id.
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As the District Court noted, the October 2004 Memo
“was spurred by at least one parent’s complaint,” as well as the
practical impossibility of including every religion in a December
holiday concert. Stratechuk, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 744. In fact, the
concerns that led to the October 2004 Memo were the very type
of concerns underlying the Establishment Clause jurisprudence
in this area, i.e., the need for government neutrality towards
religious institutions and beliefs, McCreary County, 545 U.S. at
860, and the impressionability of young children, Edwards, 482
U.S. at 583-84. In addition, as Amici note, “the Constitution
does not require the School to promote religion to the
constitutionally permitted maximum and its failure to do so does
not make it anti-religious in any constitutionally significant way.
School districts can determine how close to the ‘Establishment
Clause line’ they wish to place themselves . . . .” Amici Br. at
33.
Moreover, as the School District points out, Stratechuk’s
argument that the purpose of the “current interpretation of Policy
2270 is to unconstitutionally disapprove of religion and, in
particular, Christianity . . . is based largely upon plaintiff’s
inaccurate factual contention that defendants’ policy amounts to
a ban on religious music in the school system.” Appellee’s Br.
at 37. To the contrary, it is clear that the policy, as interpreted,
does not prevent – and the record shows that it has not in fact
prevented – the teaching of religious holiday songs in the
classroom or the performance of songs with religious content at
the December concerts (albeit not songs specifically related to
winter holidays).
It follows that the District Court did not err in holding
that the School District’s actions did not have an impermissible
purpose within the meaning of Lemon.
Turning to the Lemon test’s effect prong, which considers
whether the “principal or primary effect” of the challenged
policy or practice “advances []or inhibits religion,” Lemon, 403
U.S. at 613, we note Justice O’Connor’s explanation that “[t]he
effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government’s actual
purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of
15

endorsement or disapproval,” Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690
(O’Connor, J., concurring). “While an adjudication of [a
policy’s] effect must take into account the perspective of one
who is neither Christian nor Jewish, as well as of those who
adhere to either of these religions, the constitutionality of its
effect must also be judged according to the standard of a
‘reasonable observer.’” County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 620 (1989) (opinion of Blackmun, J.). In a passage
describing the endorsement test that is often quoted to describe
the effects prong of the Lemon test, Justice O’Connor also noted
that “the ‘history and ubiquity’ of a practice is relevant because
it provides part of the context in which a reasonable observer
evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice conveys a
message of endorsement of religion.” Id. at 630 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
Stratechuk argues that the “‘effect’ of the School
District’s ban on the performance of religious music, irrespective
of any alleged ‘purpose,’ conveys a message of disapproval of
religion . . . .” Appellant’s Br. at 44. For example, Stratechuk
maintains that “[t]he reasonable observer would know that the
MLK Gospel Choir was permitted in the past to perform
traditional Christmas religious music at the Columbia High
School Holiday Assembly but has now been banned from
performing at this event pursuant to the School District’s new
policy. . . . In the final analysis, an informed, reasonable
observer would conclude that [the policy] has the effect of
disfavoring religion. . . .” Appellant’s Br. at 46-47.
The District Court rejected this argument, concluding that
“there is ample evidence available to the objective observer
regarding the interpretation of Policy 2270 in the totality of the
circumstances, which removes any claim that it conveys a
message of disapproval of religion.” Stratechuk, 577 F. Supp.
2d at 746. To this effect, the Court noted that the policy permits
the inclusion of “religious material when appropriate, provided
that it is presented objectively and that it fits within the
curriculum.” Id. The Court also noted that the policy requires
“[a]ccomodat[ion of] student-initiated expression[s] . . . which
reflect their beliefs or non-beliefs about religious themes. . . .”
16

Id. (internal quotation omitted). “Moreover, Policy 2270 allows
for the use of religious music, provided it achieves specific
goals of the music curriculum.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Moreover, the District Court also noted that “[a]lthough
the interpretation of Policy 2270 restricts the performance of
holiday music during the December concerts, music teachers
have indicated that they continue to teach those songs in the
classroom . . . and Director of Fine Arts Santoro has confirmed
the appropriateness of this practice.” Id. at 747.
Similarly, the District Court emphasized that songs with
religious content have continued to be played at the December
concerts since promulgation of the October 2004 Memo, as the
policy “simply restricts the performance of holiday music at the
time of the religious holiday that the music honors.” Id. On this
basis, the District Court had ample reason to conclude as
follows: “Given the continued performance of religious songs
and the continued teaching of holiday music in the classroom,
the objective observer would not determine that the
implementation of Policy 2270 . . . sends a message of
disapproval of religion.” Id.
We note with approval the District Court’s observation
that the restriction on “the performance of holiday music, which
changed earlier practices within the School District . . . . [did
not] automatically convey a message of disapproval of religion
because as the Supreme Court observed in County of Allegheny,
‘[a] secular state, it must be remembered, is not the same as an
atheistic or antireligious state.’” Id. at 747-48 (quoting 492 U.S.
at 610). This point is elaborated in the Amici’s brief which
states that “Establishment Clause jurisprudence recognizes that
neutrality towards religion is quite distinct from hostility towards
it.” Amici Br. at 17. The brief cites an Eleventh Circuit opinion
that states that “[a] contrary conclusion would ‘totally eviscerate
the establishment clause.’” Amici Br. at 17 (quoting Smith v.
Bd. of Comm’rs, 827 F.2d 684, 693 n.9 (11th Cir. 1987)). Smith
also quoted a Ninth Circuit case, Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No.
354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1536 (9th Cir. 1983) (Canby, J.,
concurring), which stated that “distinctions must be drawn to
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recognize not simply ‘religious’ and ‘anti-religious,’ but ‘nonreligious’ governmental activity as well.’” As the Amici note:
Were that not the case, almost every government action
vis-a-vis religion would fall into one of two columns –
pro- or anti-religion, promoting or hostile to – and be
subject to Establishment Clause attack in either event.
That is the logic of Plaintiff’s legal theory; indeed, that
theory would, ironically, subject actions that sought to
allow more religious content to that same black or white
analysis.
Amici’s Br. at 18. Numerous courts have rejected the suggestion
that “secular” means “anti-religious.” See, e.g., County of
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 610-11; Smith, 827 F.2d at 693-94;
Grove, 753 F.2d at 1536 (Canby, J., concurring).
We reject Stratechuk’s argument that the fact that
numerous students and parents have petitioned the school board
and strongly urged it to reverse its policy “demonstrat[es]
beyond genuine dispute that a reasonable observer could only
perceive that the policy disfavors religion.” Appellant’s Br. at
26. The constitutionality of a school board’s policy toward
religion cannot be decided by reference to popular opinion. See
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 316-17 (2000)
(rejecting argument that school prayer policy was constitutional
because it was approved by vote of the student body).
The final prong of the Lemon test considers whether the
challenged policy or practice “foster[s] an excessive government
entanglement with religion.” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13
(internal citation omitted). As now-Justice Alito wrote when he
was a member of this court, an excessive entanglement “requires
more than mere ‘[i]nteraction between church and state,’ for
some level of interaction has always been ‘tolerated.’” Child
Evangelism Fellowship of N.J. Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist.,
386 F.3d 514, 534 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997)). In Agostini, the Supreme Court
explained that the “factors employed ‘to assess whether an
entanglement is “excessive” are similar to the factors . . . use[d]
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to examine “effect.”’. . . Thus, we must look to ‘the character
and purposes of the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of
the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship
between the government and religious authority.’” Id. at 534-35
(quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232).
Stratechuk argues that the School District’s policy causes
excessive entanglement because “school officials will be
required to screen music to determine whether it is religious or
secular in nature [and] [d]rawing such distinctions between
secular and religious themes will necessarily cause an
entanglement with religion.” Appellant’s Br. at 48. The District
Court acknowledged that the interpretation of the policy
“involves some entanglement with religion” because the teachers
must make selections with religious concerns in mind and
because Santoro must approve these selections. Stratechuk, 577
F. Supp. 2d at 748. However, the Court concluded that “[t]his
type of oversight - this drawing of distinctions between secular
and religious themes - strikes the Court as no different from the
screening that school districts engage in every day to ensure
neutrality in matters of religion.” Id. at 749. The District Court
also observed that “[t]o conclude otherwise ignores the evidence
and would undermine governmental efforts to comply with the
Establishment Clause.” Id. We agree, and conclude that when
examined under the Lemon test, Policy 2270 does not contravene
the Establishment Clause.
B. The Endorsement Test
In light of the critique of the Lemon test, we also consider
Stratechuk’s claim that Policy 2270 fails the “endorsement test,”
a modification of the Lemon test. This test “dispenses with
Lemon’s ‘entanglement’ prong and, combining an objective
version of Lemon’s ‘purpose’ prong with its ‘effect’ prong, asks
whether a reasonable observer familiar with the history and
context of [a religious] display would perceive [it] as a
government endorsement of religion.” Modrovich v. Allegheny
County, 385 F.3d 397, 401 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Lynch, 465
U.S. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). In addition, “[t]he
endorsement test asks whether the government action has ‘the
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effect of communicating a message of government endorsement
or disapproval of religion.’” Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692
(O’Connor, J., concurring)).
The District Court held that this test did not apply because
“this matter does not involve a religious display on government
property or state participation in a religious activity.”
Stratechuk, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 742 n. 8. There is merit to
Stratechuk’s argument that this court has not limited the
endorsement test to cases involving religious displays on
government property. See, e.g., ACLU v. Black Horse Pike
Reg’l Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1471, 1486-87 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(applying endorsement test to challenge to student-led prayer at
high school graduation).
As this court stated in that case, “[t]his endorsement test
has at times been characterized as part and parcel of the Lemon
test, and at other times as separate and apart from it. Whether
‘the endorsement test’ is part of the inquiry under Lemon or a
separate inquiry apart from it, the import of the test is the same.
We must determine whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the challenged practice conveys a message
favoring or disfavoring religion.” Id. at 1485-86. The result is
the same under the endorsement test as under the effects prong
of the Lemon test and our earlier conclusion that the School
District’s policy does not exhibit endorsement or hostility
towards religion is equally applicable here.
C. Additional First Amendment Claim
Stratechuk does not limit his First Amendment challenge
to the Establishment Clause but also argues that the School
District has violated his children’s (and his) First Amendment
rights by “seek[ing] to ‘contract the spectrum of available
knowledge’ for its students by banning certain religious music
from curricular and co-curricular activities and events simply
because it is religious or associated with a religious holiday.”
Appellant’s Br. at 51. We see no merit in this argument.
Stratechuk asserts that, through Policy 2270 as
20

interpreted, “the government is seeking to remove an entire
category of ‘ideas’ from the curriculum.” Appellant’s Br. at 50
n.9. Presumably, Stratechuk equates “ideas” with religious
celebratory music. Assuming without deciding the validity of
this equation, Stratechuk’s assertion is incorrect. There is no
restriction of the students’ access to the “ideas” to which he
refers because the students have access to religious celebratory
music in the classroom within the framework of the curriculum.
The District Court construed Stratechuk’s argument as
contending that Policy 2270 as interpreted violates his children’s
right to receive information and ideas. This led the District
Court to an analysis of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bd. of
Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853 (1982), and Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260 (1988). The District Court noted that Pico dealt with
the right to receive ideas (the school board’s decision to remove
certain books from the school district’s libraries) whereas
Kuhlmeier dealt with the right to express ideas (censoring the
student newspaper). The District Court stated that although Pico
seemed on the surface more applicable to Policy 2270, it
concluded that applying Kuhlmeier was more appropriate
because the Supreme Court in that case addressed the issue as
“whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to
promote particular student speech.” 484 U.S. at 270-71.
Because the Kuhlmeier Court held that the forum at issue in that
case, the high school newspaper, was not a public forum, the
school authorities had the discretion to “exercis[e] editorial
control over the style and content of student speech in schoolsponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Id. at
273.
Using Kuhlmeier as precedent, the District Court in this
case concluded that the December concerts are not public fora,
and that the School District’s interpretation of Policy 2270 is
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. On that
basis the District Court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment with respect to Stratechuk’s First
Amendment claim. We see no error of law or abuse of
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discretion in the District Court’s analysis.
IV.
Conclusion
We do not doubt Stratechuk’s sincerity and commitment
to the position he vigorously asserts in this litigation. But the
overriding consideration for this court is that the School District
administers public schools, and there are constitutional
principles that govern the actions of public schools that do not
limit private schools. Certainly, those of us who were educated
in the public schools remember holiday celebrations replete with
Christmas carols, and possibly even Chanukah songs, to which
no objection had been raised. Since then, the governing
principles have been examined and defined with more
particularity. Many decisions about how to best create an
inclusive environment in public schools, such as those at issue
here, are left to the sound discretion of the school authorities.
We see no constitutional violation in Policy 2270 or its
application in this case.
We will therefore affirm the decision of the District
Court.
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